Introduction

Nowadays, corruption is a scourge which persistently hinders Malian economic development. Most of the country’s vital sectors are affected. In shaping this phenomenon, the appropriate methodology does not seem to be available to the actors. Despite the low number of structures addressing corruption, the expected results remain far from being achieved. The ineffectiveness must be sought at the level of the subservience of control bodies to policies and the non-existence of a legal referral mechanism for these bodies after the control missions.

System inefficiency:

In Mali, corruption has reached high records. According to the General Auditor’s latest report, Hundreds of millions of people are distracted in Mali. As per a “Monde Afrique” release, “more than €1.13 billion was spent irregularly by the Malian authorities between 2005 and 2017. It inhibits economic growth and diverts funds from health, education and other basic social sectors. It further paralyzes a state in a deep political and institutional crisis which is also plunged into a multifaceted armed conflict for more than a decade. In 2016, the situation desperately resulted in the creation of the “famous” platform to address corruption that has played an important role through the whistleblowing system and the introduction of complaints at the level of the competent courts despite the existence of numerous control structures or organizations. Among these, we can mention the general control of public services, the Office of the General Auditor, the accounts section of the Supreme Court and the Office against Illicit Enrichment.

A blatant system inefficiency

Control bodies’ subordination to the executive has two major consequences. It slows down, initially, the process of referring the matter to the competent courts for the continuation of the process. Secondly, in the event of regime change, which is very common in Mali, the process is generally blocked.

President Amadou Touré hesitations regarding the transmission of control reports to the courts and the putsch against President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in August 2020 have dealt a hard blow, for example, the activities of the Office of the Auditor General whose reports are tabled on the table of the Head of State to follow up on the start of the legal action.

Conclusion

There is an urgent need to initiate profound reforms in anti-corruption strategies in Mali. They must move towards reducing control bodies. They must also move in the direction of “depoliticization” of control bodies. These bodies must carry out their activities with complete independence. They must have a mechanism for direct referral to the competent courts for the continuation of the process concerning the defendants without intervention from the executive.